An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I provide conditions under which interval revelation is optimal. Finally, I show that the expected utilities are not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information. negative|peach) = Pr(positive|lemon) = 1 − p. The employer is positive (negative) if the interview signal is positive (negative). Finally, the employer makes a hiring decision.
Introduction
In the Bayesian persuasion literature (Rayo and Segal 2010 and Gentzkow 2011) , an uninformed sender (she) designs an information disclosure mechanism to influence the beliefs of a receiver (he) about the sender's type. I use a linear programming approach to study this problem.
In my model, the receiver privately knows his one-dimensional type and chooses between two actions: to act or not to act. Before observing her type, the sender can commit to any (stochastic) mapping from her types to messages, which I call an information disclosure mechanism. After observing the message generated by the mechanism and his type, the receiver decides whether to act. The sender's and receiver's types are drawn from a continuous joint prior distribution. The sender and receiver have continuous utility functions that depend on the sender's and receiver's types. I impose a single-crossing assumption which ensures that each message of a mechanism induces the receiver to act if and only if his type exceeds a threshold type.
It turns out that my model is equivalent to an alternative model where the receiver is uninformed, chooses a one-dimensional action, and has utility that is single-peaked in his action for each message of a mechanism. In my model, each message of a mechanism corresponds to a threshold type above which the receiver acts. Likewise, in the alternative model, each message of a mechanism corresponds to an optimal action of the uninformed receiver. That is, the receiver's threshold type in my model is isomorphic to the receiver's optimal action in the alternative model. I characterize conditions for a candidate mechanism to be optimal, and derive comparative statics on the precision of the receiver's private information. The characterization results apply directly both to my model and to the alternative model. But the comparative statics results do not apply to the alternative model, in which the receiver is uninformed. Hereafter, I discuss my results in the context of my model, in which the receiver is privately informed and chooses between two actions.
For concreteness, consider a school that wishes to persuade a potential employer to hire a student by choosing a grade disclosure policy for the student. The school can freely choose what information about the student's grades appears on the student's transcript. Moreover, the school chooses this disclosure policy before observing anything about the student. The employer observes the student's transcript but also obtains private information, for example, from conducting an employment interview with the student and competing candidates. The single-crossing assumption requires that all possible interview outcomes can be appropriately ranked.
The sender's problem of finding an optimal mechanism reduces to a linear program, because a mechanism is described by the conditional probabilities of messages given the sender's types, and the expected utilities are linear in these probabilities. The linear programming approach gives necessary and sufficient conditions under which a candidate mechanism is optimal. This enables the characterization of conditions that justify many commonly observed grade disclosure policies, such as those reported in Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) . These conditions imply that to verify that a grade disclosure policy is optimal, it suffices to check that there is no simple deviation from this policy that the school prefers. At the one extreme, some schools report all grades and class rank on transcripts. Such a full revelation mechanism is optimal if and only if the sender prefers to reveal any two of her types than to pool them. At the other extreme, some schools release no transcripts. Such a no revelation mechanism is optimal if and only if the sender prefers to pool any three of her types with the uninformative message than to pool two of them and reveal the third one.
Assume further that the sender's utility (under the receiver's optimal action) depends on the message only through the posterior expectation of the sender's type given this message. 1 Under this assumption, the sender can choose any distribution of posterior expectations of the sender's type, subject to the constraint that the prior distribution of the sender's type is a mean-preserving spread of this distribution. As a result, the shape of the optimal mechanism is jointly determined by the convexity properties of the sender's utility function and by the prior distribution of her type. I provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the sender optimally chooses an interval revelation mechanism that reveals moderate types and hides extreme types.
In general, the sender's and receiver's expected utilities under the optimal mechanism are not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information. First, as the receiver becomes more informed, his expected utility may decrease despite the fact that he is the only player who takes an action that directly affects his utility. This happens because the optimal mechanism depends on the precision of the receiver's private information, and the sender may prefer to disclose significantly less information if the receiver's information is more precise. Returning to the school-employer example, this suggests that low reliability of employment interview procedures (summarized by Arvey and Campion 1982) may be beneficial for employers, as it motivates schools to design more informative disclosure policies. Second, it may be easier for the sender to influence a more informed receiver. This happens because the sender may optimally choose to target only the receiver with favorable private information, and it becomes easier for the sender to persuade such a receiver as he becomes more informed.
The linear programming approach to Bayesian persuasion complements the standard concavification approach of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) . They work with the distribution of posterior beliefs induced by a mechanism. They define the sender's indirect utility of posterior beliefs and derive the optimal mechanism by taking the concave closure of this indirect utility function. In contrast, the linear programming approach solves the dual problem: it derives conditions under which a given mechanism is optimal.
As Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) point out, the concavification approach has limited applicability when the set of sender's types is an interval, because the set of posterior beliefs becomes infinite dimensional. The linear programming approach instead works with utilities directly expressed as functions of the one-dimensional sender's and receiver's types, and thus yields sharper results for the class of problems I consider.
My model is a special case of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , who do not restrict either the sets of receiver types and actions or the functional form of the receiver's utility. In contrast, Rayo and Segal (2010) is a special case of my model. They assume that the receiver's type is uniformly distributed and does not affect the sender's utility. 2 Subsequent to the first version of this paper, some papers on Bayesian persuasion have assumed that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) provide an alternative characterization of the set of feasible mechanisms, and use it to find optimal mechanisms in stylized examples. Kolotilin as "[s]ender's payoff depends only on the expected state." Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) also impose this assumption and characterize the unique equilibrium (rather than optimal) information disclosure mechanism.
2 In Section 4, I discuss in more detail how my paper relates to Rayo and Segal (2010) , Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , and other papers on Bayesian persuasion. et al. (2017) allow the sender to condition mechanisms on the receiver's reports, and provide simple sufficient conditions for optimality of upper censorship-a special case of the interval revelation mechanisms characterized in this paper. 3
School-employer example
A school chooses a grading policy to maximize the probability of an employer hiring a student. The student is either a peach or a lemon. The school and the employer have a common prior belief that the student is a peach with probability 0 2. The employer hires the student if the employer believes that the student is a peach with probability at least 0 5. The timing of the game is as follows. First, the school chooses a grading policy described by a finite (ordered) set M of grades and the conditional distribution of grades given the student's type. Second, the student's type is drawn and the grade is generated according to . Third, the employer observes the grade and conducts an employment interview. The interview produces a two-valued signal about the student's type with precision p ∈ [1/2 1] in the sense that Pr(positive|peach) = Pr(negative|lemon) = p and
The marginal utilities of grades A, B, and C are 1, 2p(1 − p), and 0; the prices of these grades are p, (1 − p), and 0. Thus, the school faces a trade-off: choose a grading policy that generates A with a small probability and persuades both the negative and positive employers or choose a grading policy that generates B with a high probability but persuades only the positive employer. The school resolves this trade-off by choosing a policy that frequently generates grades with the highest marginal utility-price ratio (1/p for A and 2p for B).
As an aside, this argument that optimal grading policies should frequently generate messages with high marginal utility-price ratios requires the student's type to take only two values, but does not rely on the cardinality of the set of receiver's types, the utility functional forms, or the form of the joint distribution of the sender's and receiver's types.
The optimal grading policy can take three forms depending on the interview precision. If the interview is imprecise (1/2 ≤ p < 1/ √ 2), the marginal utility-price ratio is higher for A than for B, so the optimal grading policy targets the negative employer and generates grades A and C. If the interview is precise (p > 1/ √ 2), the ratio is higher for B, so the optimal policy targets the positive employer. In this case, if it is impossible to convince the positive employer with probability 1 (p < 4/5), the optimal policy generates grades B and C; otherwise (p > 4/5), the optimal policy generates grades A and B.
When the interview is not too precise (p < 4/5), the optimal grading policy exhibits grade inflation: peaches and some lemons get a good grade but only lemons get a bad grade. Moreover, when the interview is imprecise (p < 1/ √ 2), grade inflation is moderate and a good grade impresses all employers. When the interview is relatively precise (1/ √ 2 < p < 4/5), grade inflation is severe and a good grade convinces only the positive employer. Finally, when the interview is too precise (p > 4/5), the optimal grading policy is noisy: with a positive probability, a peach gets a bad grade and a lemon gets a good grade. Figure 1 shows that the school and employer's expected utilities under the optimal grading policy are not monotonic in the interview precision. 4 Naive intuition may suggest that (i) the school's expected utility should decrease with p because it is harder to influence a better informed employer and (ii) the employer's expected utility should increase with p because a better informed employer takes a more appropriate hiring decision. This naive intuition, however, ignores that the optimal mechanism changes with p and the school may choose to disclose significantly less information when the employer is more informed. This effect may overturn the naive intuition. In equilibrium, a more informative interview may help the school because the employer hires more students; it may also hurt the employer because the employer hires worse students.
In fact, the school's expected utility strictly increases with the interview precision for p ∈ (1/ √ 2 4/5), where the optimal grading policy targets the positive employer. As the interview precision increases, the positive employer becomes more positive, so it becomes easier for the school to persuade the employer. Moreover, the employer's expected utility drops down to 0 as the interview precision exceeds 1/ √ 2. At p around 1/ √ 2, neither the positive nor the negative employer would hire if the grading policy was completely uninformative. For p slightly above 1/ √ 2, the optimal grading policy targets the positive employer and thus extracts all rent from the positive employer. In contrast, for p slightly below 1/ √ 2, the optimal grading policy targets the negative employer, and thus leaves some rent to the positive employer.
Model

Setup
Consider a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses an information disclosure mechanism (described below) and the receiver takes one of two actions: to act (a = 1) or not to act (a = 0).
The set of receiver's types is R = [r r] and the set of sender's types is S = [s s]. The pair (r s) has some joint prior distribution. For this joint distribution, the marginal distribution F(s) of s and the conditional distribution G(r|s) of r given s admit strictly positive densities f (s) and g(r|s) that are continuous in s and continuously differentiable in r.
The sender's and receiver's utilities from a = 0 are normalized to zero. The sender's and receiver's utilities from a = 1 are v(r s) and u(r s), respectively, where functions v and u are continuous in s and continuously differentiable in r.
Before s is realized, the sender chooses a mechanism that sends a message m ∈ R to the receiver as a (stochastic) function of the sender's type s. Specifically, the sender chooses a joint distribution (m s) of m and s such that the marginal distribution of s under equals the prior marginal distribution F .
The timing of the communication game is as follows. First, the sender publicly chooses a mechanism . Second, a triple (m s r) is drawn according to distributions and G. Third, the receiver observes (m r) and takes an action a. Finally, the sender's and receiver's utilities are realized.
Let P (s|m) denote the distribution of s given m under . The distribution of s given m and r is then I impose a single-crossing assumption that ensures that each message of a mechanism induces the receiver to act if and only if his type exceeds a threshold type.
Assumption 1 (Single crossing). For each distribution Q on S, there exists r Q ∈ R such that S u(r s) dQ(s) 0 if r r Q . Moreover, there exists a strictly decreasing function r * that satisfies u(r * (s) s) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
A message m of a mechanism induces a distribution Q of s. By Assumption 1, after observing m, the receiver of type r Q is indifferent between the two actions, and the receiver of type r > r Q strictly prefers to act. Without loss of generality, I restrict attention to mechanisms such that each message m of induces the receiver to act if and only if r ≥ m. 5 Therefore, the set of feasible messages is the image R * ≡ r * (S) of S under r * , and the sender's expected utility from message m ∈ R * is V (m s) ≡ r m v(r s)g(r|s) dr Remark 1. Assumption 1 is stronger than a standard single-crossing assumption, which requires that for each distribution Q on S, inequality S u(r 1 s) dQ(s) ≥ (>)0 implies S u(r 2 s) dQ(s) ≥ (>)0 whenever r 2 > r 1 . This standard single-crossing assumption holds if and only if, for all s 1 s 2 ∈ S, functions u(r s 1 ) and u(r s 2 ) of r ∈ R satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity (Theorem 1 of Quah and Strulovici 2012) . In particular, it holds if u(r s) increases with (r s) and types (r s) are affiliated. Remark 2. Equivalent to Assumption 2, I could directly assume that the sender's expected utility V depends only on E [s|m]. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) refer to this assumption as "[s]ender's payoff depends only on the expected state." This assumption may hold even if the receiver has more than two actions. In particular, it holds if the set of actions is compact, the sender's and receiver's types are independent, and the sender's and receiver's utility functions are linear in the sender's type and continuous in the receiver's type and action. Parallel to Assumption 1, I impose an assumption that ensures that for each message of a mechanism the receiver's utility is single-peaked in his action.
Equivalent alternative model
Assumption 1 (Single crossing). For each distribution Q on S, there exists r Q ∈ R such that S [−∂U(r s)/∂r] dQ(s) 0 if r r Q . Moreover, there exists a strictly decreasing function r * that satisfies ∂U(r * (s) s)/∂r = 0 for all s ∈ S.
It turns out that the sender's problem of choosing an optimal mechanism in this alternative model under Assumption 1 is the same as in the original model from Section 3.1 under Assumption 1. Given v, u, and g from the original model, set V (r s) = r r v(r s)g(r|s) dr and U(r s) = r r u(r s)g(r|s) dr. 7 Notice that in both models, a message m under mechanism induces some distribution Q of s. In the original model, Q induces the receiver to act if and only if r ≥ r Q , so the sender's utility is r r Q v(r s)g(r|s) dr = 6 Notice that if r is replaced with −r in Assumption 2, then higher types of the receiver are more willing to act, and Assumption 1 holds. But exposition is easier without this replacement. Notice also that Assumption 2 requires r to be independent of s. In the context of the school-employer example, s may correspond to the student's type privately known by the school, and r may correspond to the opportunity cost from hiring privately known by the employer. 7 Equivalently, given V and U from this alternative model, set v, u, and g such that v(r s)g(r|s) = −∂V (r s)/∂r and u(r s)g(r|s) = −∂U(r s)/∂r. V (r Q s); in this alternative model, Q induces the receiver to take action r Q , so the sender's utility is again V (r Q s). The receiver's threshold type r Q in the original model is thus isomorphic to the receiver's optimal action r Q in this alternative model.
Similar to the equivalence between Assumptions 1 and 1 , the following assumption is equivalent to Assumption 2.
Under Assumption 2 , the receiver takes action r = E [s|m]. Therefore, a message m of a mechanism satisfies m = E [s|m], and the sender's expected utility from a message m is V (m), as in the original model.
To sum up, this alternative model with Assumptions 1 and 2 is equivalent to the original model with Assumptions 1 and 2. Consequently, all the results in Section 4 hold verbatim in this alternative model.
Optimal mechanisms
Section 4.1 sets up the sender's problem as a linear program and presents some basic duality results. Under Assumption 1, Section 4.2 characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions under which the full and no revelation mechanisms are optimal. Under Assumption 2, Section 4.3 characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions under which an interval revelation mechanism is optimal.
A mechanism is called an interval revelation mechanism with bounds s L and s H if s L s H ∈ S, s L ≤ s H , and it generates one message for all s ∈ [s s L ), another message for all s ∈ (s H s], and a different message for each s ∈ (s L s H ). 8 In particular, the full revelation mechanism (denoted by full ) is an interval revelation mechanism with bounds s L = s and s H = s, and the no revelation mechanism (denoted by no ) is an interval revelation mechanism with bounds s L = s H = s (or, equivalently, s L = s H = s).
Linear programming characterization
Under Assumption 1, an optimal mechanism is a distribution that solves the primal linear program 
The objective function is the sender's expected utility under . The first constraint (P1) is the feasibility requirement that the marginal distribution of s under is F . The second constraint (P2) is the consistency requirement that message m = r makes the receiver r indifferent between the two actions.
The dual problem is to find bounded measurable functions η and ν that
The variables η(s) and ν(r) are multipliers for constraints (P1) and (P2). Say that is feasible for (P) if it is a distribution that satisfies (P1) and (P2). Similarly, say that η and ν are feasible for (D) if they are bounded measurable functions that satisfy (D1). Feasible and (η ν) that solve their respective problems (P) and (D) are called optimal solutions.
Lemma 1 gives sufficient conditions under which candidate feasible solutions and (η ν) are optimal. Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If is feasible for (P), (η ν) is feasible for (D), and
then and (η ν) are optimal solutions, and the values of (P) and (D) are the same.
Lemma 2 establishes the existence of optimal solutions and shows that complementarity condition (C) is not only sufficient but also necessary for optimality of and (η ν).
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. There exists an optimal mechanism , an optimal solution to the primal problem (P). There exists an optimal solution to the dual problem (D) in which η is continuous. Moreover, (C) holds for these optimal and (η ν).
Lemmas 1 and 2 yield necessary and sufficient conditions under which a given mechanism is optimal. Specifically, a candidate mechanism is optimal if and only if there exists (η ν) that satisfies feasibility condition (D1) and complementarity condition (C). Given (D1), condition (C) holds if and only if η(s) = V (r s) − u(r s)ν(r) for all (r s) in the support of . For this η(s), we can find conditions on the primitives u, V , and F that are equivalent to the existence of function ν(r) that satisfies (D1). 9 Lemma 1 (Lemma 2) implies that these conditions are sufficient (necessary) for to be optimal.
Full and no revelation under single crossing
Besides their simplicity and widespread use, the full revelation mechanism full and the no revelation mechanism no satisfy two important properties under Assumption 1.
First, full and no are extremal in the following strong sense: (i) full uniquely maximizes the receiver's expected utility and (ii) no uniquely minimizes the receiver's expected utility (see Proposition 6 in the Appendix). Second, if the sender privately knew s, did not have commitment power, and always preferred to act in that v(r s) > 0 for all (r s), then (i) full would be the unique equilibrium outcome of a persuasion game (Milgrom 1981) in which the sender can withhold information but cannot misrepresent information, and (ii) no would be the unique equilibrium outcome of a cheap-talk game (Crawford and Sobel 1982) in which the sender can say anything. 10 The first main result derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which full and no are optimal. Note that full generates message r * (s) for each s ∈ S, and no generates the same message r no for all s ∈ S, where r no is a unique r that solves (i) All mechanisms are optimal if and only if, for all s 1 s 2 ∈ S and r ∈ R such that s 2 > s 1 and r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )),
(ii) The full revelation mechanism is optimal if and only if, for all s 1 s 2 ∈ S and r ∈ R such that s 2 > s 1 and r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )),
(iii) The no revelation mechanism is optimal if and only if, for all s 1 s 2 ∈ S and r ∈ R such that s 2 > s 1 and r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )),
To verify optimality of a mechanism , one needs to check that no deviation from to any feasible mechanism increases the sender's expected utility, which requires a lot of checks. It turns out that Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows: for optimality of full and no , it is necessary and sufficient to check that only certain deviations from these mechanisms do not increase the sender's expected utility. I now define these deviations. 10 In the persuasion game, if the sender sent the same message r for two or more different s in equilibrium, then there would exist s such that the sender s sent r but u(r s) > 0, which leads to a contradiction because the sender s would strictly prefer to reveal her type. In the cheap-talk game, if the sender sent two different messages r 1 and r 2 in equilibrium, then she would strictly prefer to send min{r 1 r 2 } regardless of s, which leads to a contradiction.
For any s 1 s 2 ∈ S and r ∈ R such that s 2 > s 1 and r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )), say that the sender prefers to reveal s 1 and s 2 than to pool them at r if, for the prior distribution that assigns probabilities p 1 and p 2 = 1 − p 1 on states s 1 and s 2 that make type r indifferent between the two actions, 2 i=1 p i u(r s i ) = 0, the sender's expected utility is higher under the full revelation mechanism than under the no revelation mechanism,
Similarly, say that the sender is indifferent between revealing s 1 and s 2 , and pooling them at r if (4) holds with equality. For any s 1 s 2 s 3 ∈ S and r ∈ R such that s 2 > s 1 , r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )), and sgn(r no − r) = sgn(r * (s 3 ) − r no ), say that the sender prefers to pool s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 at r no than to pool s 1 and s 2 at r, and to reveal s 3 if, for the prior distribution that assigns probabilities p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 = 1 − p 1 − p 2 on states s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 that make type r no indifferent between the two actions, 3 i=1 p i u(r no s i ) = 0, and make type r indifferent between the two actions given that s = s 3 , 2 i=1 p i u(r s i ) = 0, the sender's expected utility is higher under the no revelation mechanism than under the mechanism that generates message r for s 1 and s 2 and message r * (s 3 ) for s 3 ,
Finally, say that the sender prefers to pool s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 at r no than to pool s 1 and s 2 at r, and to reveal s 3 for s 3 approaching s no if (5) holds in the limit as s 3 → s no . Using these definitions, I can now restate Proposition 1 as follows.
Corollary 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
(i) All mechanisms are optimal if and only if, for all s 1 s 2 ∈ S and r ∈ R such that s 2 > s 1 and r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )), the sender is indifferent between revealing s 1 and s 2 and pooling them at r.
(ii) The full revelation mechanism is optimal if and only if, for all s 1 s 2 ∈ S and r ∈ R such that s 2 > s 1 and r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )), the sender prefers to reveal s 1 and s 2 than to pool them at r.
(iii) The no revelation mechanism is optimal if and only if, for all s 1 s 2 ∈ S and r ∈ R such that s 2 > s 1 and r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )), the sender prefers to pool s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 at r no than to pool s 1 and s 2 at r and to reveal s 3 for s 3 approaching s no .
Conditions (1)-(3) in Proposition 1 are weaker than the corresponding conditions in (a)-(c) below from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). 11 Following the notation of Assumption 1, suppose a message m of a mechanism generates posterior distribution Q(s) = P (s|m) of s, and let r Q be the receiver's type who is indifferent between the two actions. The sender's indirect expected utility under Q is V (Q) = S V (r Q s) dQ(s). Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) obtain the following results:
(a) All mechanisms are optimal if V (Q) is linear in Q, so that the sender is indifferent between separating posteriors Q 1 and Q 2 and pooling them at αQ 1 + (1 − α)Q 2 .
(b) The full revelation mechanism is optimal if V (Q) is convex in Q, so that the sender prefers to separate Q 1 and Q 2 than to pool them at αQ 1 + (1 − α)Q 2 .
(c) The no revelation mechanism is optimal if the concave closure of V evaluated at the prior F is equal to V (F), 12 so that (after a moment of reflection), for Q F whose mean is arbitrarily close to E F [s], the sender prefers to pool Q and Q F at F than to separate them.
Proposition 1 shows that it is sufficient to check (a) and (b) only for degenerate distributions Q 1 and Q 2 whose supports are s 1 and s 2 , respectively, and to check (c) only for discrete Q whose support is {s 1 s 2 } and degenerate Q F whose support is s 3 , where s 3 is arbitrarily close to s no . Conditions (1)-(3) are necessary because, for optimality of a candidate mechanism, one needs to check all deviations from the mechanism, including those described in (1)-(3).
The proof of sufficiency of conditions (1)-(3) relies on Lemmas 1 and 2, but we can build the intuition by focusing on decomposed mechanisms in which each message is sent by at most two types of the sender. To justify this focus, I construct a decomposed version of no for the case in which u(r s) is linear in s, s is uniformly distributed on S = [−1 1], and r is independent of s. Consider a mechanism that sends a message m 0 for s = 0 and a different message m e for each pair {−e e} of S, where e ∈ (0 1]. Noting that E[s|m e ] = E[s] = 0 for all e ∈ [0 1] implies that this (decomposed) mechanism induces the same mapping from (r s) to the receiver's action as no . This argument can be generalized to show that any mechanism can be decomposed in this way.
I now discuss the intuition for sufficiency conditions of Proposition 1, starting from part (i). Consider any nontrivial message of a decomposed mechanism. This message is sent by some two types of the sender. By (1), the sender is indifferent between revealing these two types and pooling them, so the sender is indifferent between the original mechanism and the mechanism that differs only in that it reveals these two types. Continuously modifying the original mechanism for each message until all types are revealed implies that the sender is indifferent between the original mechanism and full , so part (i) follows.
shows that pooling two types s 2 > s 1 yields a higher (lower) expected utility to the sender than separating them if v(s 2 ) ≤ v(s 1 ) (if v(s 2 ) ≥ v(s 1 )). If, in addition, v(s) = bs + c for all s, then Assumption 2 holds and Proposition 1 implies that (i) all mechanisms are optimal if b = 0, (ii) full is optimal if b > 0, and (iii) no is optimal if b < 0 (see Corollary 2 below). 12 Intuitively, a concave closure of a function (defined on a convex set) is the smallest concave function that is everywhere greater than the original function.
I now turn to part (ii) of Proposition 1. Again, consider any nontrivial message of a decomposed mechanism. This message is sent by some two types of the sender. By (2), the sender prefers to reveal these two types than to pool them, so the sender prefers the mechanism that differs from the original one only in that it reveals these two types. Continuously modifying the original mechanism for each message until all types are revealed implies that the sender prefers full to the original mechanism, so part (ii) follows.
Finally, I provide the intuition for a weaker version of part (iii) of Proposition 1. Namely, if the sender prefers to pool s 1 , s 1 , s 2 , s 2 at r no than to pool s 1 , s 1 at r 1 and to pool s 2 , s 2 at r 2 for all feasible s 1 , s 1 , s 2 , s 2 , r 1 , r 2 , then no is optimal. Consider two nontrivial messages of a decomposed mechanism. Suppose that the first message m 1 is sent by s 1 and s 1 and makes the receiver r 1 ≤ r no indifferent. Similarly, suppose that the second message m 2 is sent by s 2 and s 2 and makes the receiver r 2 ≥ r no indifferent. The sender prefers the mechanism that differs only in that it sends one message that makes the receiver r no indifferent instead of sending both m 1 and m 2 . Continuously applying this argument for pairs of messages until all types are pooled implies that the sender prefers no to the original mechanism, so this weaker version of part (iii) follows.
Interval revelation under linearity
Under Assumption 2, Proposition 2 simplifies the sender's problem of finding an optimal mechanism to a problem of finding an optimal distribution of messages. (6) represents the sender's expected utility; the constraint in (6) describes the set of feasible distributions of m. 13 The intuition for the constraint is as follows. If F is a mean-preserving spread of H, then F is more informative about the sender's type than H in the sense of Blackwell (1953) . A mechanism can garble the sender's information to achieve any less informative distribution H of m than the prior F . Conversely, because a mechanism can only garble the sender's information, F must be a mean-preserving spread of H for any feasible mechanism.
By Proposition 2, the curvature of V determines the form of the optimal mechanism. Corollary 2. Suppose Assumption 2 holds and let r no = E F [s].
(i) All mechanisms are optimal if and only if V is linear on S. 13 Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) (ii) The full revelation mechanism is optimal if and only if V is convex on S.
(iii) The no revelation mechanism is optimal if and only if, for all r ∈ S, V (r) ≤ V (r no ) + V (r no )(r − r no ).
All three parts of Corollary 2 are straightforward implications of (6). 14 First, if V is linear, then the sender is risk neutral, so all mechanisms are optimal. Second, if V is convex, then the sender is risk loving, so the full revelation mechanism is optimal. Third, if V is concave, then the sender is risk averse, so the no revelation mechanism is optimal. More precisely, part (iii) requires that the concave closure V of V on S is equal to V at r no .
The second main result derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which an interval revelation mechanism with bounds s L and s H is optimal. This mechanism generates message r L = E F [s|s < s L ] for all s ∈ [s s L ), message r H = E F [s|s > s H ] for all s ∈ (s H s], and message s for each s ∈ (s L s H ). In a special case of s L = s H , the revelation interval (s L s H ) is empty, so the mechanism generates only two messages, r L and r H . I now discuss implications of Proposition 3 for the case when the derivative V (r) of the sender's expected utility is either unimodal or bimodal. The derivative V is unimodal if it has a unique local (and therefore global) maximum at r m ∈ R; the maximum point r m is called a mode. Consider the case of unimodal V in which r m ∈ S and r no < r t , where r t is the point of tangency illustrated in Figure 2(a) . 15 If F were to assign strictly positive probabilities only on s and s, then the optimal mechanism would send two messages s and r t and the sender's expected utility would achieve the concave closure V(r no ). This mechanism, however, is not feasible when F admits a density, because s is equal to s with probability 0. By part (i) of Proposition 3, s L = s and s H ∈ (s s), so the optimal mechanism reveals s for s < s H and sends the same message r H for all s > s H , where the bound s H is determined by the condition that the sender is indifferent between revealing s H and pooling it with r H . 16 The derivative V is bimodal if it has two local maxima at r m r m ∈ R. If r m < s < r t < r no < s < r m , where r t is the point of tangency illustrated in Figure 2(b) , then, by part (i) of Proposition 3, s H = s and s L ∈ (s s), so the optimal mechanism reveals s for s > s L and sends the same message r L for all s < s L . If r m < s < r t < r no < r m < r t < s, where r t and r t are the points of tangency illustrated in Figure 2 (c), then the optimal mechanism takes one of the following three forms. The first two forms correspond to the interval revelation mechanisms (with interior bounds s L s H ∈ (s s)) from parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3. The third form corresponds to the mechanism that sends the two messages r t and r t , so that the sender's expected utility achieves the concave closure V(r no ). 17
Comparative statics
This section studies the value of the receiver's information. I depart from the assumptions of Section 3 and instead impose the following three assumptions.
Assumption 3. The utilities u and v are increasing in s. 16 In an extreme case, when V is a step function with V (r) = 0 for r < r t and V (r) = 1 for r ≥ r t , the optimal mechanism reveals s for s < s H and sends the same message r t for s > s H , where s H is a unique solution to E F [s|s > s H ] = r t . This is the case of an uninformed receiver (r = r t with probability 1) studied in Kolotilin (2015) . 17 This mechanism does not generally belong to the class of interval revelation mechanisms, so this case is not considered in Proposition 3. Assumption 3 requires that the sender and receiver are more willing to act for higher types s. Assumption 4 requires that the receiver's type affects the receiver's belief but does not directly affect the sender's and receiver's utilities. Assumption 5 requires that the sender can influence the receiver's action but cannot achieve her first-best outcome if the receiver is uninformed. Assumption 3 is mainly for ease of presentation, Assumption 4 is crucial for Proposition 4, and Assumption 5 is crucial for Proposition 5.
Let the set of receiver's types R be finite, so the receiver's information structure G can be described by conditional probabilities q(r|s) of r given s, where q(r|s) is a measurable function of s for each r ∈ R. For each G, the sender's and receiver's expected utilities under the optimal mechanism are denoted by V G and U G , respectively. I use Blackwell's (1953) ordering of information structures: G is more informative than G if there exists a stochastic matrix D such that q (r |s) = r∈R D(r |r)q(r|s) for all (r s) ∈ R × S. An information structure G is public if q(r|s) is either 0 or 1 for all (r s) ∈ R × S; that is, the receiver's type is deterministically determined by the sender's type if G is public. Let G full and G no represent fully informative and completely uninformative (public) information structures. That is, R full = S and q full (s|s) = 1 for all s ∈ S, and R no = {r no } and q no (r no |s) = 1 for all s ∈ S. Although R full is not finite, it is clear that any information structure G is less informative than G full and more informative than G no .
Before discussing non-monotone comparative statics, I present a benchmark result (also found in Kolotilin 2015) that provides sufficient conditions for monotone comparative statics. 18 The receiver's expected utility increases and the sender's expected utility decreases with the precision of the receiver's private information if this precision is either very low or very high. Moreover, this monotonicity holds for all levels of precision if the receiver's information is public.
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumptions 3-5 hold and distribution F admits a strictly positive density f on S.
(i) For any information structure G, we have
(ii) For any two public information structures G and G such that G is more informative
Intuitively, if G and G are public, and G is more informative than G , then, under G , the sender can first make public information more precise, from G to G, and then implement any mechanism available under G, implying V G ≥ V G . To get the intuition for the receiver's part of Proposition 4, suppose that the sender's utility is type-independent, so that v(s) = 1 for all s. In this case, under public G, the optimal mechanism and the no revelation mechanism give the same expected utility to the receiver, implying U G ≥ U G .
In light of Proposition 4, the utility non-monotonicity presented in Section 2 can only arise when the receiver's information is private and its precision is intermediate. The next proposition shows that if the sender's type can take only two values, it is always possible to increase the precision of the receiver's private information in such a way that the sender's and receiver's expected utilities change non-monotonically. 19 Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions 3-5 hold and the support of F is {s s}. There exist two binary information structures G and G , such that G is more informative than G , yet
The intuition for Proposition 5 is similar to that in the school-employer example. Since the sender's type can take only two values, without loss of generality, I assume that r = Pr(s|r) for all r ∈ R. By Assumption 5, the sender wants to persuade the receiver to act, but the receiver prefers not to act if he has no information beyond the prior. By continuity, we can find the receiver's type r > Pr(s) who would still prefer not to act under the no revelation mechanism. A binary information structure of the receiver with r < r becomes more informative if r decreases and r stays constant. As r decreases, the probability of r increases, because Pr(r)r + Pr(r)r = Pr(s), so it becomes relatively more attractive for the sender to target r than r. There exists a critical value r at which the sender is exactly indifferent between which of the two types of the receiver to target. Above this value, the sender targets r and the receiver's expected utility is strictly positive, because r strictly prefers to act whenever r acts. Below this value, the sender targets r, the receiver's expected utility is zero, and the sender's expected utility increases as the receiver's private information becomes more precise (r decreases), because the probability of r increases.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The lemma can be proved by applying Theorem 2.1 of Anderson and Nash (1987) to my model. But, to make the paper self-contained, I prove this lemma here.
Since η is bounded and measurable on set S, (P1) implies Pr(s) = 1/2, and a binary information structure with the restriction that q(r|s) = q(r|s) = p. They show that the set of implementable outcomes (and, thus, the sender's expected utility) decreases with the precision of the receiver's private information p. This monotonicity does not hold without the restriction that q(r|s) = q(r|s) = p. Since their example satisfies Assumptions 3-5, Proposition 5 implies that there exist two binary information structures G and G such that G is more informative than G , yet the sender is strictly better off under G.
Since ν is bounded and measurable on set R, (P2) implies 
Suppose that (C) holds for some feasible (η ν) and . Conditions (7) and (8) yield
Consider any other feasible . Conditions (7) and (8) showing that is an optimal solution to the primal problem (P). An analogous argument proves that (η ν) is an optimal solution to (D). Finally, (9) shows that the values of (P) and (D) are the same.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof of this lemma is a modification of the proof of Theorem 5.2 in Anderson and Nash (1987) , whose notation I closely follow.
Conventions. The primal variable is in M r (R * × S), the space of finite signed measures on R * × S with the total variation norm. The mechanism is chosen from the positive closed convex cone P of finite positive measures on R * × S. The dual constraint function V (r s) is in C(R * × S), the space of continuous measurable functions on R * × S with the uniform norm. The dual variables (η ν) are in L ∞ (S) × L ∞ (R * ), the space of bounded measurable functions with the uniform norm. The primal constraint function (f θ) is in L 1 (S) × L 1 (R * ), the space of absolutely integrable functions with the 1-norm, where θ is a zero function on the right hand side of (P2).
Optimal solution to (P). One feasible for the primal problem (P) is the full revelation mechanism. The feasible set of the primal problem is bounded because the total variation of any probability measure is equal to 1. The constraint map in (P1) is continuous because it is a projection; the constraint map in (P2) is continuous because u is continuous. The space M r is the dual of C by Corollary 14.15 of Aliprantis and Border (2006) . Therefore, there exists an optimal solution by Theorem 3.20 in Anderson and Nash (1987) .
Optimal solution to (D) . Since V is continuous on the compact set R * ×S, there exists a finite value V = max r s V (r s). Functions η(s) = V and ν(r) = 0 are feasible for the dual problem, and the set of feasible (η ν) can be bounded without affecting the value of the dual problem. The constraint map in (D1) is continuous because u is continuous. The space L ∞ is the dual of L 1 by Theorem 13.28 of Aliprantis and Border (2006) . Therefore, there exists an optimal solution (η ν) by Theorem 3.20 in Anderson and Nash (1987) .
Equality (C) under optimal solutions. As can be seen from above, the dual problem has a finite value, and functions η(s) = 2V and ν(r) = 0 are in the interior of the constraint set (D1). Therefore, there is no duality gap by Theorem 3.13 in Anderson and Nash (1987) .
Continuity of η. Observe that if (η ν) is optimal, then (η * ν) is also optimal, where η * (s) = sup r V (r s) − u(r s)ν(r)
Indeed, η * is feasible and η * ≤ η, because η satisfies (D1) for all r, so the objective in (D) is smaller under η * . I now show that η * is continuous. Since R * × S is compact, V and u are uniformly continuous. Thus, since ν is bounded, for any ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that where the first inequality holds by definition of η * , the second holds by (10), and the third holds by (11). Analogously, η * (s) > η * (s ) − 2ε, so |η * (s) − η * (s )| < 2ε whenever |s − s | < δ, implying that η * is continuous.
Proof of Proposition 1. The "if " part of part (i). Consider any mechanism . Note that condition (1) The "only if " part of part (i) . Suppose, to get a contradiction, that there exist s 2 > s 1 , and r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )) such that
(The case in which the left hand side of (12) is strictly smaller than the right hand side is analogous.) Let w 1 (x) = x u(r s)f (s) ds. There exists ε 1 > 0 such that the function w 1 is continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing on [s 1 s 1 + ε 1 ], and vanishing at s 1 . Likewise, there exists ε 2 > 0 such that the function w 2 is continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing on [s 2 − ε 2 s 2 ], and vanishing at s 2 . Thus, on [s 2 − ε 2 s 2 ], we can define a continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing function s * 1 (x) that satisfies w 1 (s * 1 (x)) + w 2 (x) = 0. By the implicit function theorem,
By continuity, there exists x 2 < s 2 such that (12) holds for all (s 1 s 2 ) ∈ [s 1 s * 1 (x 2 )] × [x 2 s 2 ]. Consider two mechanisms that differ only in that one reveals s for all s ∈ [s 1 s * 1 (x 2 )] ∪ [x 2 s 2 ] and the other sends the same message for all s ∈ [s 1 s * 1 (x 2 )] ∪ [x 2 s 2 ]. That is, the former mechanism sends r * (s) and the latter sends r, because w 1 (s * 1 (x)) + w 2 (x) = 0. The sender strictly prefers the former mechanism, because the difference in the sender's expected utility between the former and latter mechanisms is
where the inequality holds by (12) and the equality holds by (13) and the change of variables formula. This concludes the proof of the "only if" part of part (i). Part (ii). By Lemmas 1 and 2, full is optimal if and only if there exists feasible (η ν) that satisfies Since u(r * (s) s) = 0, we have η(s) = V (r * (s) s) almost everywhere. Since η is continuous by Lemma 2, and V and r * are continuous by assumption, η(s) = V (r * (s) s) holds for all s ∈ S. Therefore, full is optimal if and only if there exists ν that satisfies (D1), 15) which is equivalent to
for all r ∈ (r * (s) r * (s)) and s 1 , s 2 such that r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )). 
which is equivalent to
for all r ∈ (r * (s) r * (s)), and s 1 s 2 ∈ S such that r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )). (For r ∈ {r * (s) r * (s)}, the existence of ν is obvious because (16) bounds ν only from one side.) At r = r no , both sides of (17) become ν(r no ). Thus, for (17) to be satisfied everywhere, the derivatives of both sides of (17) with respect to r evaluated at r = r no must coincide, which gives ν(r no ) = ∂V (r no s 1 )/∂r u(r no s 1 ) − ∂V (r no s 2 )/∂r u(r no s 2 ) ∂ u(r no s 1 )/∂r u(r no s 1 ) − ∂ u(r no s 2 )/∂r u(r no s 2 )
Taking the limit of (18) as s 2 ↓ s no gives ν(r no ) = ∂V (r no s no )/∂r ∂ u(r no s no )/∂r
Substituting ν(r no ) from (19) into (17) completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. Parts (i) and (ii). Since p 2 = 1 − p 1 and 2 i=1 p i u(r s i ) = 0, p 1 = u(r s 2 ) u(r s 2 ) − u(r s 1 ) and p 2 = − u(r s 1 ) u(r s 2 ) − u(r s 1 ) By Assumption 1, u(r s 1 ) < 0 < u(r s 2 ) because r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )); so p 1 p 2 ∈ (0 1). Substituting p 1 and p 2 in (4) gives (2). Finally, (4) with equality is equivalent to (1).
Part (iii) . Since sgn(r no − r) = sgn(r * (s 3 ) − r no ), either r no ∈ (r r * (s 3 )) or r no ∈ (r * (s 3 ) r). Suppose that r no ∈ (r r * (s 3 )) (the other case is analogous). By Assumption 1, u(r no s 3 ) < 0 because r no < r * (s 3 ), u(r s 1 ) < 0 < u(r s 2 ) because r ∈ (r * (s 2 ) r * (s 1 )), and 2 i=1 p i u(r no s i ) > 0 because r no > r and 2 i=1 p i u(r s i ) = 0. Therefore, the system of equations p 1 + p 2 + p 3 = 1, 3 i=1 p i u(r no s i ) = 0, and 2 i=1 p i u(r s i ) = 0 has a unique solution p 1 p 2 p 3 ∈ (0 1). Substituting these p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 into (5) and rearranging gives
Taking the limit of this inequality as s 3 → s no gives (3) Proof of Proposition 2. Any mechanism , whose messages m satisfy m = E [s|m], generates messages with a distribution H having the property that distribution F is a mean-preserving spread of H. It remains to verify that any distribution H having this property can be generated by a feasible mechanism. If F is a mean- 
By part (iii) of Proposition 1, no is optimal if and only if (3) holds, which simplifies to the condition of part (iii) of Corollary 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. The "only if " part of part (i). By Lemma 2, if the described mechanism is optimal, then there exists feasible (η ν) that satisfies The "if " part of part (i). Consider the described mechanism and the constructed pair (η ν):
The complementarity condition (C) holds by construction. Moreover, (η ν) is feasible for (D), because, for all (r s) ∈ S × S, we have
where the first inequality holds because η(s) is convex for all s ∈ S and −ν(r) is a subderivative of η(r) for all r ∈ S. Therefore, by Lemma 1, is optimal.
The "only if " part of part (ii) . The proof of the first three conditions is the same as in part (i). To prove V (r L ) ≤ V (r H ), write the feasibility condition (D1) for s ≥ s H and r = r L ,
and notice that both sides are equal at s = s H = s L and linear in s for s ≥ s H .
The "if " part of part (ii). Consider the described mechanism and the pair (η ν) from part (i). By the same argument as in part (i), is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 4. Although this proposition follows almost immediately from Kolotilin (2015) , below I provide a simpler proof adapted to this setting.
Part (i). We have V G ≥ V G full , because the sender can always achieve V G full by choosing the full revelation mechanism. Similarly, V G no ≥ V G , because an outcome produced under G by can also be achieved under G no by a mechanism that generates r according to q and m according to . Trivially, U G full ≥ U G , because the receiver is best off when he knows the sender's type.
Finally, U G ≥ U G no , because the optimal mechanism under G no gives the same expected utility to the receiver as the no revelation mechanism; that is, U G no = max{E F [u(s)] 0}. Indeed, since E F [u(s)|s : v(s) > 0] < 0 by Assumption 5, the optimal mechanism induces the receiver to act if and only if s ≥ s * , where s * is the unique solution to E F [u(s)|s ≥ s * ] = 0 (Kolotilin 2015) .
Part (ii) . Public G partitions S into disjoint subsets S r = {s : q(r|s) = 1}. Moreover, since public G is more informative than public G , G is a refinement of G ; that is, for each r ∈ R, there exists r ∈ R such that S r ⊂ S r . Therefore, an outcome produced under G by can also be achieved under G by a mechanism that refines G to G and generates m according to , which implies that V G ≥ V G .
Under public G, r is deterministically determined by s, so we can allow mechanisms to be conditioned on r. By Kolotilin (2015) , the optimal mechanism induces the receiver to act if and only if s ≥ s * (r), where s * (r) is the minimum s ∈ S such that v( s) ≥ 0 and For any r 1 and r 2 such that 0 < r 1 < μ < r 2 < 1/(1 + x), there exists a binary information structure of the receiver with R = {r 1 r 2 }, where r 1 = Pr(s|r 1 ) and r 2 = Pr(s|r 2 ). Similarly to the school-employer example, we can restrict attention to mechanisms that generate only three messages m 2 , m 1 , and m 0 , where m 2 makes the receiver r 2 indifferent, m 1 makes the receiver r 1 indifferent, and m 0 convinces both types of the receiver that s = s.
Since r 2 < 1/(1 + x), neither type of the receiver would act if the sender chose the no revelation mechanism. It is easy to show then that the optimal mechanism is either 1 that generates m 1 and m 0 or 2 that generates m 2 and m 0 .
Without loss of generality, assume that m = Pr(s|m) for all m. After receiving m i , where i ∈ {1 2}, the receiver r i holds the posterior:
Pr(s|m i r i ) = m i r i μ m i r i μ + (1 − m i )(1 − r i ) (1 − μ)
Since m i makes r i indifferent, we have Pr(s|m i r i ) = 1/(1 + x), which is equivalent to
Since the posteriors Pr(s|m) must average out to the prior Pr(s), the mechanism i generates m i with probability μ/m i . Therefore, the sender's expected utility under 1 is
Similarly, the sender's expected utility under 2 is V 2 = μ m 2 (1 − m 2 ) Pr(r 2 |s)v(s) + m 2 Pr(r 2 |s)v(s) = (μ − r 1 )r 2 xv(s) + v(s) r 2 − r 1
In the limit r 1 ↓ 0, we have V 2 = μ(xv(s) + v(s)) > μv(s) = V 1 , but in the limit r 1 ↑ μ, we have V 1 = μ(xv(s) + v(s)) > 0 = V 2 . Since both V 1 and V 2 are continuous in r 1 , for each r * 2 ∈ (μ 1/(1 + x)), there exists an r * 1 ∈ (0 μ) at which V 1 = V 2 . Let G and G be the two information structures with R = {r * 1 /2 r * 2 } and R = {r * 1 r * 2 }, respectively. Because r 1 ≤ r 1 and r 2 ≥ r 2 , G is more informative than G . Under G , the sender is indifferent between 1 and 2 , so 1 is an optimal mechanism. Since V 1 increases with r 1 and V 2 decreases with r 1 , the sender's optimal mechanism under G is 2 . The receiver's expected utility is 0 under 2 and is strictly positive under 1 , so U G > U G . Since V 2 decreases with r 1 , the sender is strictly better off under G, so V G > V G . Proposition 6. Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
(i) The receiver's expected utility under full is strictly higher than under any other . 
Equation (20) holds because a message m induces the receiver r to act if and only if r ≥ m. The first equality in (21) holds because full generates message r * (s) for each s ∈ S. Similarly, the first equality in (22) holds because no generates r no for all s ∈ S. The second equality in (21) and (22) 
By Assumption 1, we have u( r s) > 0 for r > r * (s), so r r * (s) u( r s) d r > 0 for r > r * (s). Any that differs from full puts strictly positive probability on the event r > r * (s); otherwise R * ×S u(r s) d (r s) would be strictly negative rather than zero. Therefore, the first integral in (23) is strictly positive. The analogous argument shows that the second integral in (23) is strictly negative, so E full [u] − E [u] > 0 for any that differs from full .
Part (ii). For a mechanism , denote the conditional distribution of s given a message r by P (s|r) and the marginal distribution of message r by P (r). Fubini's theorem 
By Assumption 1, we have S u( r s) dP (s|r) > 0 for r > r. Therefore, r no r S u( r s) dP (s|r) d r > 0 for r < r no Since P (r) of any mechanism that differs from no puts strictly positive probability on messages in [r r no ), the first integral in (24) is strictly positive. The analogous argument shows that the second integral in (24) is strictly negative, so E [u] − E no [u] > 0 for any that differs from no .
